Abstract-In the scope of quantization·based watermarking techniques and additive attacks, there exists a common belief that the worst case attack (WCA) is giwn by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Nevertheless, it has not been proved that the AWGN is indeed the WCA within the class of additive attacks against quantization. based watermarking. In this paper, the analysis of the WCA is theoretically developed with probability of error as a cost function. The adopted approach includes the possibility of masking the attack by a target probability density function (PDF) in order to trick smart decoding. The developed attack upper bounds the probability of error for quantization· based embedding schemes within the class of additive attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE design of the worst case attack is an active line of research in communications. The knowledge of the WCA points out the weakness or the strength of a given technique and allows to create a fair benchmark for different communications methods.
The study of the WCA within the scope of digital data hiding technologies has even higher importance in many practical applications. Currently, the benchmarking of most data-hiding techniques is perfonned against the additive white Gaussian noise attack [I] , [2] . However, the real attacker is an aggressive character whose primary goal is to destroy Of to prevent the reliable decoding of hidden information. This goal is achieved by applying the least favorable conditions against particular data-hiding systems.
Considering different data-hiding benchmarking methods, the two most widely used are presented. The first one is based on estimation of the infonnation-theoretic limits, i.e., the capacity. According to the second method, the practical efficiency of the embedding strategies is analyzed with respect to the bit error rate.
The common belief about superiority of quantization-based methods is established based on their testing in the AWGN scenario. Motivated by the fact, first shown in [3] that the AWGN is not the WCA against the quantization-based tech niques, one can conclude that the WCA against these methods
is still an open problem.
Thus, we formulate the goal of this paper as the investi gation of the worst additive attack strategy for a fixed quan tization·based watennarking communications scenario which is depicted in Fig. 1 . In this set-up, the message b should be communicated via the host channel X and the attacking channel p (ylv'). The message b is encoded into a watermark W taking into account the host state X. We assume here that both the encoder and the decoder are fixed while the attacker can apply any additive attack changing the transition probability p (ylv'}.
To underline the importance of this problem, we would like to point out that its solution will allow us to justify a valid benchmarking set-up instead of applying commonly accepted AWGN as the WCA.
This paper is organized as follows. The fundamentals of the quantization-based techniques under analysis are described in Section II. The problem formulation is presented in Section
Ill. The justification of the proposed set-up and constraints is explained in Section IV. Finally, in Section V the probabi lity of error is analyzed for the quantization-based techniques according to the proposed WCA and compared with the AWGN and unifonn noise attacks.
II. QUANTIZATION-BASED TECHNIQUES
Within the class of quantization·based techniques, we will concentrate our analysis on both dither modulation (DM) (I] and distortion compensated DM (DC-DM) [2] . Both are ap proximations of Costa [4] scheme with a structured codebook where binning strategy is exploited.
Dither modulation: The watermarked data is obtained as:
where different quantizers Qb, (-) are used to embed a symbol bi into the host x as it is shown in Fig. 2 for the binary case.
The quantizers will be constructed for both DM and DC-DM using subtractive dithering [5] that corresponds in the binary case to:
where do = -fl./2 and dl = D./2 assuming that the quantization bin width is 2fl.. As a result of the quantization embedding, the watermark distortion can be expressed as:
where E[·] denotes the expected value. The output PDF /y, ( . )
is a quantized version of the host PDF fxO. � 2
where it is evident that if 0: < 1 the value of the distortion of the DM (3) is larger than the one of DC-DM (5) . This provides an opportunity to increase � and subsequently to improve on the performance for the same Dw.
The output PDF iy' (-) of the DC-DM technique is a train of uniform pulses instead of a train of 0 functions due to the distortion compensation, as it is presented in Fig. 3 , where
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Fig. 3. DC-DM output PDF ty, (-).
In both the DM and DC-DM, the probability of error can be calculated as the integral of the equivalent noise PDF over the support of the wrong bins S with respect to the communicated message bit [3] :
The error region S is illustrated in Fig. 4 assuming that one of the symbols is sent for the binary signaling case and hard decision is used at the decoder. The errorless region will be denoted as the complementary set S. In case of the AWGN, equation (6) is equal to the integral over the hatched area on 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
McKellips and Verdu considered the problem of worst case additive attack design for the PAM, having chosen the probability of error Pe as a cost function [6] . In their approach, the attack has bounded energy. Besides the energy, they also considered a possibility of masking the noise PDF by a target distribution frO with variance O'f in order to trick a smart decoding strategy when the decoder can estimate the attack PDF to choose an appropriate decoding strategy .
The Kullback-Leibler distance (KLD) [7] between the target distribution and the optimized WCA PDF fzO is proposed as an additional optimization constraint.
Adopting their approach to our quantization-based set-up, we impose constraints on the attack power, target PDF and tolerance in the KLD sense. The objective of optimization is to find the PDF of the attack which satisfi es the above constraints while producing the largest possible value of the cost function, i.e., the probability of error. This PDF of the attack will constitute the least favorable distribution for the decoder for the given class of attacking strategies.
The optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
max Pe = max f jy(x)dx (8)
(10)
fyO is the PDF of the received signal Y = X + W + Z. X represents the host data, lV stands for the quantization-based watermark [1] , [2] and Z denotes the attack. O'� in (9) con strains the attack variance assuming fLz = f�oo xfz(x)dx = 0, and (3 in (10) determines the tolerance in the KLD sense.
The constraint (8) follows from PD ' F defi nition, which also imposes fz(x) ? 0, Vx E n.
The optimization is performed using the Lagrangian multi plier method:
IV. PROBLEM SOLUTION
In general, no close analytical solution of (7) PDF to a set of a-functions. Fig. 6 represents a Gaussian target PDF with variance O'f = O"� and the WCA PDF against the DM [1] where the bin width is equal to 1. It is assumed that the embedded symbol is located at the origin. Fig. 6 (a) and 6(b) show the WCA when the tolerance factor (3 with the target attack is small for different attack powers. The WCA is masked by the target PDF (Gaussian). Fig. 6 (c) and 6(d) represent the same analysis for larger tolerance factors, where the PDF shape of the result varies to increase the probability of error for the same attack energy. suggests three-O' functions. Two of them are located in the two error regions S that are the closest to the origin, and the third one is located at the origin to contribute to the PDF but not to the the attack power. However, a hypothetical smart decoder can apply more sophisticated decoding strategies than the originally proposed minimum distance decoder [I], [2] .
This motivates the attacker to mask the applied attack to avoid the possibility to be detected while degrading communications performance as much as possible.
Such an attack provides a probability of error equal Pe = 1 which is easily reversed to Pe = 0 inverting the bits value.
In fact, from the mutual information point of view there is no uncertainty. Therefore we will restrict the probability of error to 0 � Pe � 0.5.
The 3-0' attack PDF is presented in Fig. 7 . For both DM and DC-DM, it is neccesary to optimize the parameters T and V in order to maximize the probability of error as 6 ---> 00. The amplitude of the o-functions V and 1 -2V guarantees that the integral of the PDF is always I for 0 � V :S 0.5. In practice, we will always constrain V < 0,25 in order to have a maximum probability of error equals to 0.5. The energy of the proposed attack is given by (J1Z = 0):
t1-
Dither modulation: The convolution between the output PDF fy, (.) of the DM technique and the proposed attack (Fig. 7) is a set of delta functions. The optimal point T where to fix the position of the deltas T is T = � + c where E > 0, E .... .. . O. In this case, the probability of error which is equal to the integral over the error region S is Pe = 2V. Using equations (3) and (12), it is possible to write:
where WNR denotes the watermark-to-noise ratio. The above equation (13) produces:
Distortion-compensation DM: The derivation of the WCA when 0' .... .. . 00 for the DC-DM is similar to the DM but now the received signal PDF fy (-) is the convolution of a set of delta functions with a pulse, which is the result of the DC-DM embedding scheme. The convolution is presented in Fig. 8 for one of the periodical bins on Fig. 4 where:
and the nearest error bin of the error region S represented in Fig. 4 initiates at M. The probability of error of the 3-6 attack for DC-DM is: V
The maximization of equation (16), using (5), (12), I< =
(1-0:).6.. and 111 = /l /2 from DC-DM embedding (4), Fig. 3 , is achieved by:
a -o:) /l , 0: ;::: �.
The result from equation (17), using (5) and (12) 
V. RESULTS OF COMPUTER MODELING
In the previous section, the analysis of the probability of error has been performed. Fig. 9 presents the results of the above asymptotic case ({3 � 00), for which the WCA PDF is composed of a set of three b-functions. In Fig. 9(a) , the probability of error is shown as a function of the DC DM distortion compensation factor a: for different WNR. To prove the efficiency of the proposed attack, we compare the probability of error for the developed attack vs. Gaussian and unifonn attacks (Fig. 9(b) ). The DM is shown as a special case of the DC-DM if a = 1. Therefore, it becomes evident from The choice of a Gaussian is due to common belief that it was the WCA. In our simulation AWGN is the target attack fTO. In [3J, Perez-Gonzalez et al demonstrate that uniform noise attack is worse than the Gaussian for some WNR and DC-DM distortion compensation factor. The results on Fig. 10 show that our developed 3-8 attack is always worse than the Gaussian and uniform noise attacks, for all WNR and DC-DM A very important conclusion from the previous results is the existence of a compensation parameter that can be chosen in advance at the encoder to guarantee a given system performance disregarding the attack PDF for a given WNR.
The optimal DC-DM compensation parameter a: can be chosen equal a = 2/3 in order to guarantee that the probability of error is bounded, and its maximum value does not exceed the Pe of the WCA. In previous schemes [2] , [4J the optimal compensation parameter a: was obtained when both the PDF and the pow. er of the noise were known at the encoder.
Nevertheless, a mismatch between their prediction and the real noise can considerably degrade the system perfonnance.
Here, we demonstrate that a: = 2/3 is the optimal DC-DM compensation parameter for all WNR since it is the minimum from (14) and (18) as it is presented in Fig, 9(a) . Therefore, a blind encoder can use this value without any knowledge of the additive attack PDF, The maximum probability of error is determined only by the WNR.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the worst case energy constrained additive at tack against quantization-based watermarking techniques was developed. Depending on the tolerance factor, it is possible to hide the statistical properties of the attack preventing the smart decoding. The closed form analytical solution for the problem in the asymptotic case ((3 � 00) was obtained. The superiority of the designed attack over the classically used AWGN and uniform noise attacks was shown. Finally, we want to emphasize that an optimal compensation factor a for the DC-DM method exists, which independently on the WNR gives the optimal system performance undergoing the developed attack. 
